Memphis Criminal Defense Lawyers

2009

Certiorari granted by Tennessee Supreme Court. Case tried by other counsel and a life sentence imposed. Massey McClusky hired for appeal. The issue presented was whether a trial judge’s failure to give all lesser included offenses is “harmless error” in light of Court’s recent decision in State v. Rodriguez. Argument and ruling pending.

2007

First Degree Murder conviction and life sentence reversed and remanded for a new trial due to the record created and issues preserved during trial. The trial court allowed a state’s witness to testify about a prior homicide conviction under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 404 (a)(2) to rebut the claim of accident or mistake asserted as a defense through counsel in opening statement to the jury.  The Court of Criminal Appeals by opinion dated September 13, 2007 ruled that statements of counsel are not evidence, therefore no evidence had been presented for the state to rebut.  The trial court’s allowing such testimony of the facts surrounding a prior homicide conviction was reversible error. (See opinion at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/opinions/tcca/pdf/073/ruddkopn.pdf)

2007

Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that drug interdiction officer’s “frisk and sit” of motorist was constitutionally unreasonable. Case handled by Massey in trial court and on appeal. 34 pounds of cocaine were found in the vehicle during the stop and was suppressed by the Court. The case was remanded to the trial court and dismissed. The client was facing 15 to 25 years in jail if convicted.  The opinion described Massey’s cross examination of the drug officer as “meticulous”. This is one of the most important cases of the last two decades regarding automobile stops and searches.  (See opinion at 235 S.W.3d 99)

2004

Drug case conviction and 15 year sentence reversed by Court of Criminal Appeals. At trial defendant was represented by a different lawyer.  On appeal he was represented by William Massey.  The court ruled that a prior felony drug conviction could not be used under Rule 609 to impeach the credibility of the accused if he testified at trial in a drug prosecution.  The case was remanded and Massey settled it for time served. (See opinion at http://www.tncourts.gov/opinions/tcca/pdf/032/moreis.pdf)

2003

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court and ruled that “...a defendant who has counsel retained by a family member may still be declared indigent for purposes of seeking investigative or expert services.” ... “The question for determination is not whether the third party has the funds to provide necessary services, but rather, does the defendant personally have the means to finance such services.”  The bottom line of this ruling is that a privately retained attorney may still get state funds for services necessary to provide an effective defense for the client.

2002

Tennessee Supreme Court expanded the post 48 hour exclusionary rule under Huddleston to include tangible evidence. (See opinion at 154 S.W.3d 71)

2001

Tennessee Supreme Court recognized for the first time that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit execution of the mentally retarded.  This was a landmark decision in Tennessee wherein the Court declared that such executions, when applied to the mentally retarded, “... violated evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, are grossly disproportionate, and serve no valid penological purpose in any case.” This casewas later cited as supporting authority by the United States Supreme Court in the Atkins opinion.  Brock Mehler and William D. Massey were counsel of record on this appeal.  (See opinion at 66 S.W.3d 790)

1993

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed two drug convictionsand a life sentence from a large drug conspiracy case.  (See opinion at 997 F.2d 219 C.A.6 (Tenn.), 1993)

1991

Tennessee Supreme Court reversed trial court’s revocation of defendant’s community corrections sentence. There must be a sufficient factual basis established at the revocation hearing, and a mere arrest while on probation does not provide a legally sufficient basis for revocation.  (See opinion at 811 S.W.2d 79)